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Abstract
Amethod for conducting Bayesian elicitation and learning in risk assessment is presented.
It assumes that the risk process can be described as a fault tree. This is viewed as a belief
network, for which prior distributions on primary event probabilities are elicited by means
of a pairwise comparison approach. A Bayesian updating procedure, following observation
of some or all of the events in the fault tree, is described. The application is illustrated
through the motivating example of risk assessment of spacecraft explosion during controlled
re-entry.
Keywords: Bayesian methods, Belief network, Fault tree analysis, Pairwise comparison,
Prior elicitation, Risk analysis, Spacecraft re-entry, Space debris.
1 Introduction
The belief network, otherwise known as a Bayesian network or directed acyclic graph, is a powerful
tool for the probabilistic modelling of systems of random variables. Originally proposed for use
in the quantitative risk assessment of systems at least as early as Barlow (1988), its relationship
to a fault tree and the reliability block diagram was recognized quite quickly (Bobbio et al., 2001;
Torres Toledano and Sucar, 1998). The general methodology is well described in papers such
as Langseth and Portinale (2007) and Neil et al. (2007). It provides a structure around which
to elicit the system risk in terms of its causal events, update the elicited assessment with data
and explore the risk’s sensitivity to the probability of those causes. It permits the modelling
of dependent failure modes e.g. through a common cause (Mi et al., 2012). The structure of
the belief network can be derived from a fault tree analysis, and indeed it can be viewed as
a generalization that allows richer probabilistic relationships between events in the tree. It is
particularly suited to assessments where there are uncertainties in the relationships between
events in the system and the risk of interest.
In this paper we focus on its use as a generalization of a fault tree analysis, where the main
interest is in learning about the probability of the top event, and where a fault tree has been
constructed that relates it to the occurrence of one or more primary or intermediate causal events.
Furthermore, we focus on a common situation where:
1. There is substantial expert opinion but that constraints on the availability of the experts,
or their experience of an elicitation process, meaning that the elicitation process must be
kept simple;
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2. There are limited data from past instances of the risky event, meaning that this information
must be used to the full but that also there is uncertainty in the risk assessment that must
be properly quantified. In other words, typically some of the events in the fault tree are
not observed, and which are observed may change from one observation to the next.
This situation is ubiquitous when one is discussing risks associated with the emergence of a new
technology or where a new risk is identified for an existing system. The benefits of the approach
described here are a light elicitation burden on the experts and the proper management of
uncertainties through the Bayesian paradigm.
The use of a panel of experts for risk analysis has been studied at some length; see Aspinall
and Cooke (1997) and O’Hagan et al. (2006) for example. One common approach, and the one
we adopt here, is that of elicitation by pairwise comparison that has been used since the early
days of elicitation methods Gulliksen (1959); Guo and Sanner (2010). It is recognized as one
of the simpler ways of accessing expert opinion. A method motivated by the analytic hierarchy
process is described, although equally any other pairwise comparison approach could be used.
The motivating example for this work comes from an application in the space industry. To
reduce the creation of space debris, operators are increasingly resorting to a controlled re-entry of
satellites and spacecraft once they are no longer needed, with the objective that they will largely
burn up in the atmosphere. The re-entry trajectory is designed so that any components that do
reach the surface will land in areas of remote ocean, such as the South Pacific. A recent example,
and the motivation for this work, is the European Space Agency’s Automated Transfer Vehicle
(ATV), built to supply the International Space Station. Other examples of situations where the
approach of this paper may be relevant are nuclear power Verma et al. (2015), maritime safety
van Dorp and Merrick (2010); Zhang and Thai (2016) or counter-terrorism Merrick and McLay
(2010).
This paper begins with a brief description of fault trees, belief networks and their relationship,
and sets up notation. In Section 3, the use of pairwise comparison to elicit priors on the primary
event probabilities is discussed. Section 4 explores how the elicited risk assessment can be updated
with data that gives only partial information about the events in the tree. Section 6 presents the
main conclusions of the work. Section 5 describes the application of the approach to spacecraft
re-entry.
2 Fault trees and belief networks
Consider a fault tree, such as on the left of Figure 1, describing the logical relationship between a
set of events in a system, culminating in the top event of interest. The value of each node in the
tree is in {0, 1,NA}, with 1 indicating that the event has been observed to occur, 0 indicating
that it has been observed not to have occurred, and NA indicating that it has not been observed.
Aside from the top event, and following standard terminology, a primary or base event has no
causes developed further in the tree, while an intermediate event is the consequence of other
events in the tree. The logic in this tree can be represented as a directed acyclic graph or belief
network that brings it into the probabilistic risk modelling domain Bobbio et al. (2001). In this
representation, primary events are assumed to be independent. This logic can be enriched with
probabilistic rather than deterministic relationships between events by specifying probability
tables for the occurrence of each event in terms of the values of its parents in the network.
Leaving aside for the moment the issue of whether an event is observed, let there be n events
in the tree, with Ei ∈ {0, 1} representing whether event i occurred or not, i = 1, . . . , n. Let
E1:i = {E1, . . . , Ei} represent the first i of these events and let ηi ⊂ {E1, . . . , En} denote the
immediate causal events of event i in the tree, also known as the parents of Ei in the language of
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Figure 1: From left to right: a fault tree for a system with 4 primary events (E1 to E4), 2
intermediate events (E5 and E6) and the top event E7, the equivalent representation as a belief
network and the belief network extended to include the primary events probabilities pi = P (Ei =
1), i = 1, . . . , 4.
belief networks. If event i is primary then ηi = ∅. Let Hi represent all ancestors (parents, parents
of parents, etc.) of Ei. Assume that there are k < n primary events and that they are labelled
E1, . . . , Ek, and also assume that the top event is En. For the primary events, let pi = P (Ei = 1)
and let p = (p1, . . . , pk) denote the set of primary event probabilities. Also note that, because
of the tree structure of the network, we can label events in the tree such that the index of all
ancestors of Ei are indexed before i, by first labelling the primary events, then the children of
primary events, etc. so that Hi ⊆ E1:i−1. It will also be useful to define the successors (children,
grandchildren, etc.) of Ei as Si.
In the belief network representation, stochastic nodes for each pi are added and they are
assigned prior distributions, usually beta distributions for reasons of conjugacy. The network
logic then implies prior distributions for the probability of intermediate events and the top event.
In other words, when the belief network just models the logic of the fault tree, prior specification
of the primary event probabilities is sufficient to specify the prior of the probability of any event
in the tree. For example, the probability p that an event occurs, in terms of 2 independent causal
events that occur with probabilities p1 and p2 is given by p = 1− (1− p1)(1− p2) in the case of
an OR gate in the tree, or p = p1 p2 in the case of an AND gate. The prior distribution f(p),
in terms of the prior distribution f1(p1, p2), is then obtained by the usual rules of distribution
of functions of a random variable (Grimmett and Welsh, 2014, Chapter 6). These distributions
are often not in a closed form but in practice are approximated by Monte Carlo simulation from
the primary event prior. For example, assuming independent beta(4,10) prior distributions for
each of the 4 primary events in Figure 1, Figure 2 shows kernel density estimates of the marginal
prior distributions of p5 = 1− (1− p1)(1− p2), p6 = p3 p4 and the top event probability
p7 = 1− (1− p5)(1− p6) = 1− (1− p1)(1− p2)(1− p3p4)
based on 10,000 simulations of (p1, p2, p3, p4). The prior distribution of p7 is then the initial risk
assessment based on the specification of the prior distributions for the primary events.
3 Primary Event Probability Prior Elicitation
Following construction of the fault tree, prior distributions for the pi are elicited from expert
opinion. Many elicitation methods are now available Dias et al. (2018); Garthwaite et al. (2005),
and any of these can in principle be applied at this stage. In this work, focus is on constructing
independent beta prior distributions for each pi, because of their subsequent tractability. Since
the amount of time that experts can devote to elicitation is often short — in our spacecraft re-
entry example, the experts were engineers with many other demands on their time — a simpler
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Figure 2: Kernel density estimates of the marginal prior distributions of p5, p6 and the top event
probability p7 for the example in Figure 1, based on samples from a beta(4,10) prior distribution
on each of the 4 primary events.
elicitation scheme, such as one based on pairwise comparisons, is attractive. There is an extensive
literature on this approach. Bradley and Terry (1952) describe an early approach, which is
discussed and compared in some detail by Cooke (1991); Szwed et al. (2006) is a more recent
use. Here we describe an alternative pairwise comparison approach.
The expert is asked to select the ’cornerstone’ primary event Ei∗ that he or she has most
confidence in giving a prior distribution of its probability. A standard elicitation approach is then
used to specify a beta prior distribution of this event’s probability. In this work, a range of values
of the probability (p(L), p(U)) is elicited and the prior is specified to be the beta distribution that
has this range as its central 95% probability interval; computing this range is an easy numerical
exercise since the quantiles of the beta distribution can be accurately and quickly approximated.
Then the expert is asked a series of pairwise comparison questions to rate whether each other
primary event is more or less likely to occur than the cornerstone event. The expert is asked
to rate the probability of a primary event as being equally, moderately, strongly, very strongly
or absolutely more or less than another. At a minimum, each primary event is compared in
this way with the cornerstone event. Ideally all pairwise comparisons would be elicited. Where
Ei and Ej are compared, the comparison of Ej to Ei is assumed to be the reverse e.g. if Ei is
strongly more probable than Ej then Ej is assumed to be strongly less probable than Ei. These
9 qualitative comparisons are mapped to a numerical score, motivated by the similar approach
in the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) method for eliciting preferences Saaty (1980), whose
use in prior elicitation has been recognized e.g. Cagno et al. (2000). The comparison scores are
placed in a matrix Q = (qij), with qij representing the score of the comparison between Ei and
Ej . These scores are then mapped to a weight wi for each event through the geometric mean
approach of Crawford and Williams (1985), where a smaller weight indicates an event that has
been elicited to have a lower probability of occurring (see the Appendix).
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Comparison (E1 to E2) Desired prior Score
mean on p2
Absolutely less probable 0.95 0.17
Very strongly less probable 0.85 0.21
Strongly less probable 0.75 0.28
Moderately less probable 0.60 0.53
Equally probable 0.50 1.00
Moderately more probable 0.40 1.04
Strongly more probable 0.25 1.23
Very strongly more probable 0.15 1.52
Absolutely more probable 0.05 2.55
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Figure 3: The mapping of qualitative pairwise comparisons to a score (left) and the effect of
these on the elicited prior for p2 in the case of comparing it with a uniform prior on p1 (right).
The circle is the prior mean and the line indicates the central 95% prior probability.
The weights are used to specify a range of values for each pi as
wi
wi∗
p(L) ≤ pi ≤ min
(
1,
wi
wi∗
p(U)
)
, (1)
where w∗i is the weight of the cornerstone event. This interval is then mapped to a beta prior
distribution that has it as its central 95% probability interval. This has the effect of shifting
prior weight to lower values of pi when Ei is rated less likely on average than Ei∗ .
Figure 3 shows the scores that we use. These scores are derived from the following simple
example of 2 events, with E1 as the cornerstone event. Assuming that a uniform prior is assessed
on p1, so with mean 0.5, the scores are derived that give a prior mean for p2 from 0.95 to
0.05 (from an absolutely less probable to absolutely more probable comparison) under the above
procedure.
As a simple example, consider the system with 4 primary events as in Figure 1. Figure 4
illustrates the prior elicitation stage where E1 is deemed to be the cornerstone event and the
expert gives an interval (0.01, 0.05) as the range for its probability, which equates to a beta
distribution with parameters 2.5 and 120. The left column of the plot shows the case where
a full set of pairwise comparisons is made, as given in the matrix Q, from which the method
of Crawford and Williams (1985) derives weights w. The figure then shows the resulting beta
prior distributions for the primary events, following Equation 1 for the other 3 events as well as
event 1 and then finally the resulting prior distribution on the top event probability. The prior
expectation of each primary event pi and for the top event is also given. The right column shows
the case where only comparisons with the cornerstone event are available.
4 Incorporation of Partial Data about the Event
Once the fault tree is defined and primary event probability prior distributions are elicited, the
risk assessment can be updated with data about the event. In this section, it is derived for 2
cases: the complete case, where all n events in the tree are observed, and the incomplete case,
where only a subset of the events are observed.
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Q =

1.00 0.21 1.04 0.53
1.52 1.00 1.04 1.52
0.53 0.53 1.00 0.17
1.04 0.21 2.55 1.00

w = (0.162, 0.444, 0.120, 0.273)
E(p1:4) = (0.020, 0.068, 0.015, 0.043)
E(p7) = 0.088
Q =

1.00 0.21 1.04 0.53
1.52 1.00 – –
0.53 – 1.00 –
1.04 – – 1.00

w = (0.136, 0.425, 0.148, 0.291)
E(p1:4) = (0.020, 0.077, 0.023, 0.054)
E(p7) = 0.097
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Figure 4: Elicitation of 4 primary events. Event 1 is the cornerstone event with elicited interval
(0.01, 0.05).
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4.1 Likelihood for a Complete Observation
The likelihood is P (E1, . . . , En |p) in this case. Recalling the standard result of a belief network
that the joint distribution of the variables in the network is the product of the probabilities of
each variable given its parents, we have
P (E1, . . . , En |p) =
n∏
i=1
P (Ei | ηi,p).
Since E1, . . . , Ek are the primary events that are assumed independent, with P (Ei | pi) = pEii (1−
pi)
1−Ei , one has
p(E1, . . . , En |p) =
(
k∏
i=1
P (Ei | pi)
)(
n∏
i=k+1
P (Ei | ηi,p)
)
=
(
k∏
i=1
pEii (1− pi)1−Ei
)(
n∏
i=k+1
P (Ei | ηi,p)
)
,
=
(
k∏
i=1
pEii (1− pi)1−Ei
)(
n∏
i=k+1
P (Ei | ηi)
)
; (2)
the last line comes from the independence of non-primary Ei from p given ηi. The value of these
Ei are logically derived from the fault tree. If Ei is the result of an AND gate then Ei = 1 if
and only if Ej = 1 for all Ej ∈ ηi, while if it is the result of an OR gate then Ei = 1 if and only
if Ei = 1 for some Ej ∈ ηi. Hence P (Ei | ηi) is either 1 or 0, depending on whether the values
of Ei and ηi are consistent with the logic of the fault tree or not. To summarize, the likelihood
for p from a complete observation, given by Equation 2, is a product of the Bernoulli likelihoods
of each primary event as long as the logic of the fault tree is respected for all the non-primary
event values. If it is not respected then the likelihood is 0.
4.2 Likelihood for an Incomplete Observation
The more common scenario in situations that interest this paper is that only a subset E ⊂
{E1, . . . , En} is observed. The likelihood is now P (E |p).
A general approach to deriving this likelihood is by marginalisation of the complete likelihood
over the events that are not in E :
P (E |p) =
∑
Ei=0,1
Ei /∈E
P (E1, . . . , En |p)
=
∑
Ei=0,1
Ei /∈E
(
k∏
i=1
pEii (1− pi)1−Ei
)
×
(
n∏
i=k+1
P (Ei | ηi)
)
. (3)
Factoring out any observed primary events from the sum gives
P (E |p) =
 k∏
i=1
Ei∈E
pEii (1− pi)1−Ei
× ∑
Ei=0,1
Ei /∈E
 k∏
i=1
Ei /∈E
pEii (1− pi)1−Ei
×
 n∏
i=k+1
Ei /∈E
P (Ei | ηi)
 . (4)
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The final term
∏n
i=k+1 P (Ei | ηi) over intermediate events is either 1 or 0, as in Section 4.1,
depending on whether that combination of observed and unobserved event values in Ei and ηi
are consistent with the logic of the fault tree or not. Thus the likelihood is a product of the
Bernoulli likelihoods for observed primary events, multiplied by a sum of Bernoulli likelihoods
for all combinations of unobserved primary events such that the fault tree logic is respected.
Hence, one way to derive the likelihood in this case is to go through each combination of values
of the unobserved events, check to see if the fault tree logic is respected, and if it is then add the
term
∏k
i=1
Ei /∈E
pEii (1−pi)1−Ei to a sum. Once that is done, the sum is multiplied by
∏k
i=1
Ei∈E
pEii (1−
pi)
1−Ei .
As an example, take the simple system of Figure 1 where we observe E1 = 0, E3 = 1 and
E6 = 1; no other events are observed. E1 and E3 are primary events and contribute (1 − p1)p3
to the likelihood. There are 2 unobserved primary events, E2 and E4, and 2 of the 4 possible
combinations of those are consistent with the observation of E6, namely (E2, E4) = (0, 1) and
(1, 1), contributing (1−p2)p4+p2p4 = p4 to the likelihood, for a likelihood of the form (1−p1)p3p4.
This approach to constructing the likelihood permits common cause events, that is an event
can be the parent of more than one event. A disadvantage is that it does not scale to a situation
where there are a large number of unobserved events, because of the large number of combinations
of them that then must be considered.
4.3 Construction of an Incomplete Likelihood in the Pure Tree Case
When the belief network follows a tree structure, so that each event is the parent of at most one
other event, then there is a constructive approach to building the likelihood that may still be
practical even when there are a large number of unobserved events. The tree structure constraint
means that there cannot be common cause events; each event must be the cause of at most one
other event for this approach to work.
First note that in a tree, all nodes are ”converging” (e.g. 2 or more parents have a unique
child) apart from the primary nodes, which have a unique pi as their parent. In such a converging
node, the parents are independent given that the child is not observed. Hence one can partition
E into subsets that consist of an event Ei that has no observed successors, and all its observed
ancestors Hi∩E , and these subsets will be independent. Recalling that Si is the set of successors
of Ei, we have:
P (E |p) =
∏
Ei∈E
Si∩E=∅
P (Ei, Hi ∩ E |p) =
∏
Ei∈E
Si∩E=∅
P (Hi ∩ E |p) P (Ei |Hi ∩ E ,p). (5)
If the top event En is observed then there is no strict partition and Equation 5 becomes P (E |p) =
P (Hn ∩ E |p) P (En |Hn ∩ E ,p).
As regards the 2 terms on the right hand side of Equation 5:
• For P (Ei |Hi ∩ E ,p), either Ei is logically implied from Hi ∩ E , in which case P (Ei |Hi ∩
E ,p) = 1, or it is not. If it is not then we can write this probability as a function of the
unobserved primary ancestor event probabilities of Ei:
P (Ei |Hi ∩ E ,p) = gi({pj | 1 ≤ j ≤ k, Ej ∈ Hi ∩ E}); (6)
see the Appendix for the derivation of the function gi.
• One can apply Equation 5 recursively to P (Hi ∩ E |p), partitioning Hi ∩ E into subsets by
the events in Hi ∩ E that have no observed successors in Hi ∩ E . The recursion ends when
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Hi ∩ E = ∅, in which case P (Ei, Hi ∩ E |p) = P (Ei |p) and one follows the derivation in
the Appendix.
Recursive application of Equations 5 and 6 will yield the expression for the likelihood P (E |p).
Note that this method favours the situation where there are few observed events, in contrast to
the marginalisation approach of Section 4.2.
4.4 Posterior Computation
For ease of notation, in this section E could also refer to a complete observation as well as an
incomplete one. The posterior distribution of p given a set of m such observations E1, . . . , Em is
then
P (p | E1, . . . , Em) ∝ P (p)
m∏
l=1
P (El |p),
where P (El |p) has been derived using of the methods of the previous parts of this section.
Unfortunately the likelihood is not conjugate to the beta prior distributions on the pi and
so posterior calculation is implemented by Monte Carlo methods. If m is not too large then
importance sampling can be used to generate samples of p from the posterior distribution with
P (p) as the proposal distribution: a large sample of values p1, . . . ,pR is generated from the prior
(an easy task as it is a product of independent beta distributions), weights ωr =
∏m
l=1 P (El |pr)
are calculated and a posterior sample comes from sampling the pr with probabilities proportional
to the ωr. Alternatively, a random walk Metropolis sampling scheme can be used. This has been
done with zero-mean normal proposals on the logit pi; given a current p, propose λ
∗
i ∼ N(λi, s2λ),
where λi = log(pi) − log(1 − pi), from which the proposal is p∗i = eλ
∗
i /(1 + eλ
∗
i ). The proposed
vector p∗ = (p∗1, . . . , p
∗
k) is accepted with probability
min
{
1,
p(p∗)
∏m
l=1 p(El |p∗)
p(p)
∏m
l=1 p(El |p)
}
.
This approach works better when m is sufficiently large that the prior and posterior are signifi-
cantly different.
The posterior samples can be used to approximate the posterior distribution of any interme-
diate event or the top event by further simulation, as described in Section 2.
4.5 Summary and Example
A full risk assessment procedure, with calibration from data, has now been described. The
procedure starts with an expert or experts constructing a fault tree with binary events. A
pairwise comparison procedure, such as that described in Section 3, leads to the specification of
a prior distribution P (p) and hence, by the fault tree logic, to a prior on the probability of the
top event, which is usually approximated by Monte Carlo simulation. This is the output for the
initial risk assessment. If a point risk estimate is required then the prior median or mean can be
used.
This assessment can be updated with data following observation of an instance of the risky
situation. The prior distribution of p is updated to a posterior distribution that can be evaluated
by Monte Carlo methods. These posterior samples can be used to generate samples from the
posterior distribution of the top event probability. Similarly, the median or mean of these samples
can be used as a point estimate for the probability.
Figure 4 illustrated the prior elicitation stage for the simple system of Figure 1. Figure
5 shows the result of posterior updating of the prior, as obtained from the incomplete set of
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comparisons in Figure 4, after 40 randomly generated observations of this system with primary
event probabilities (0.02, 0.05, 0.05, 0.10), giving a top event probability of p7 = 0.074. This is
done for 3 cases:
• The data set is complete, with the value of all events observed;
• The same data set but incomplete, with each event randomly observed with probability
0.5;
• The same data set but with the top event observed only;
Implementation was with the random walk Metropolis algorithm over 1,000,000 iterations with
s2λ = 0.25. The figure shows very little difference in the inference between complete and 50%
incomplete data. This is not surprising in this case as, in many cases, it is possible to logically
infer most if not all of the missing values. Posterior uncertainty using the top event observation
only is somewhat larger than in the other 2 cases.
To further explore this, each of these posterior updates was repeated 100 times, each time
with data regenerated with the same true primary event probabilities. Table 1 summarises the
posterior distributions obtained over these 100 runs where a uniform prior has been assumed
for the primary event probabilities, while Table 2 repeats this for the prior obtained from the
incomplete comparisons in Figure 4. Each table shows the average of the posterior means,
standard deviations and central 95% probability intervals, as well as the root mean square error
between the posterior mean and the true value:
RMSE =
(
1
100
100∑
r=1
(pposterior,r − ptrue)2
)1/2
,
where pposterior,r is the posterior mean of p from the rth run and ptrue is the true value.
In general, the tables show that the data have the effect of moving prior distributions in the
direction of the true values. The prior coming from the elicitation is quite strong and has a large
effect on the posterior, relative to the uniform prior case, even after 40 observations. For the
primary event probabilities, the greater information in the complete data does this more than
the incomplete, which does this more than the top event only data. However, note that inference
for the top event probability is very similar across all 3 data types.
5 Application to ATV re-entry
The Autonomous Transfer Vehicle (ATV) was developed by the European Space Agency to re-
supply the International Space Station. Its mission consisted of a launch to the station with
supplies (e.g. experimental equipments, propellants and goods for the permanent crew); once
unloaded at the station, waste was placed into it. The vehicle undocked from the station and was
designed to have a controlled burn-up in the atmosphere, with any surviving fragments landing
in the remote South Pacific. Five ATVs were launched between 2008 and 2014. All successfully
resupplied the Space Station and were then successfully de-orbited.
One risk associated with the ATV, and most spacecraft that are de-orbited, is that the vehicle
will unexpectedly explode during re-entry, due to causes such as the heating of leftover fuel, which
could result in scattering debris over land Koppenwallner et al. (2005). Due to the difficulties
in observing such a re-entry, there is unlikely to be complete information on the causes of an
explosion de Pasquale et al. (2009). The question then arises as to what can be learned from the
10
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Figure 5: The prior and posterior distributions for the primary event and top event probabilities.
The top row is the prior and subsequent rows are the posterior after 40 simulated observations
of different types with p = (0.02, 0.05, 0.05, 0.1) (and so a top event probability p7 = 0.0737).
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p1 p2 p3 p4 p7
True Value 0.020 0.050 0.050 0.100 0.074
Prior Mean 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.812
Top Event Observation Only
Average of:
post. means 0.029 0.037 0.160 0.146 0.073
post. std. devs 0.027 0.032 0.258 0.258 0.038
post. 95% PIs (0.001,0.098) (0.003,0.115) (0.0001,0.703) (0.0001,0.715) (0.019,0.165)
RMSE 0.0366 0.0414 0.1938 0.1445 0.0414
Randomly Incomplete (50%)
Average of:
post. means 0.020 0.054 0.055 0.098 0.078
post. std. devs 0.016 0.033 0.040 0.057 0.040
post. 95% PIs (0.002,0.057) (0.011,0.133) (0.007,0.153) (0.020,0.236) (0.021,0.173)
RMSE 0.0290 0.0415 0.0483 0.0640 0.0465
Complete Observation
Average of:
post. means 0.021 0.053 0.057 0.103 0.078
post. std. devs 0.017 0.032 0.033 0.045 0.038
post. 95% PIs (0.002,0.065) (0.011,0.130) (0.013,0.138) (0.034,0.207) (0.024,0.168)
RMSE 0.0221 0.0346 0.0389 0.0481 0.0428
Table 1: Summary of results for the simulation study of the system in Figure 1, using a uniform
prior on each primary event probability.
p1 p2 p3 p4 p7
True Value 0.020 0.050 0.050 0.100 0.074
Prior Mean 0.020 0.077 0.023 0.054 0.097
Top Event Observation Only
Average of:
post. means 0.013 0.059 0.016 0.045 0.071
post. std. devs 0.020 0.051 0.023 0.044 0.052
post. 95% PIs (0.000,0.072) (0.003,0.191) (0.000,0.084) (0.002,0.163) (0.009,0.204)
RMSE 0.0076 0.0138 0.0341 0.0553 0.0125
Randomly Incomplete (50%)
Average of:
post. means 0.013 0.058 0.019 0.050 0.071
post. std. devs 0.020 0.053 0.024 0.044 0.055
post. 95% PIs (0.000,0.072) (0.003,0.198) (0.0001,0.087) (0.003,0.162) (0.008,0.212)
RMSE 0.0082 0.0133 0.0315 0.0480 0.0119
Complete Observation
Average of:
post. means 0.014 0.055 0.023 0.057 0.069
post. std. devs 0.020 0.052 0.025 0.045 0.055
post. 95% PIs (0.000,0.075) (0.003,0.194) (0.0003,0.091) (0.004,0.166) (0.008,0.210)
RMSE 0.0078 0.0123 0.0278 0.0448 0.0117
Table 2: Summary of results for the simulation study of the system in Figure 1, using the
incomplete pairwise comparison prior of Figure 4.
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Figure 6: Fault tree for unexpected explosion during re-entry of the Autonomous Transfer
Vehicle.
observation. De Persis (2016) conducted a fault tree analysis as part of an assessment of the risk
of this event, from which we base this analysis.
Figure 6 shows the fault tree that was elicited from expert engineers at ESA. The Appendix
gives a description of each node in the tree. Note that the tree contains only OR nodes, so that
it only takes one of the primary events to occur in order for the top event to occur. Intermediate
nodes are included in the diagram because they may be what is observable during the re-entry.
The primary nodes of the tree come in 3 groups:
Nodes 1 to 3 are events concerning propellant or the propellant tanks;
Nodes 6 to 11 are events concerning the batteries;
Nodes 4 and 5 are other causes of an explosion on re-entry.
Separate experts were consulted about each of these 3 groups. Within each group, a complete
pairwise comparison was made and the prior distributions were constructed separately from these
complete comparisons within each group. No comparisons between the 3 groups was made. The
details of the elicitation are in the Appendix. Figure 7 shows all the distinct prior distributions
of primary events that were elicited and the implied prior on the top event probability. The prior
mean for the top event probability is 0.17 with a central 95% probability interval (0.11, 0.24).
Figure 8 shows a kernel density estimate of the posterior distribution of the top event prob-
ability, given observation that all 5 re-entries occurred without explosion. These data are just
observation of the top event; however, because all nodes in the fault tree are OR gates, obser-
vation that the top event did not occur is equivalent to a complete observation that all primary
events did not occur. As expected, the posterior distribution is shifted towards smaller proba-
bilities. The posterior mean probability is now 0.10, with a central 95% probability interval of
(0.02, 0.25). Compared to the prior, the mean has decreased but uncertainty in the value of the
top event probability has actually increased because the data are somewhat in contradiction with
the prior opinion.
A detailed observation campaign of the first ATV re-entry was attempted at considerable cost,
using aircraft-based cameras that tracked the re-entry trajectory Lips et al. (2010). No similar
observation campaign was attempted subsequently. In this section an exploration of the value of
an observation campaign, that was able to observe some or all of the intermediate and primary
events in the tree, is explored through simulation. The events in the tree are simulated using
the elicited prior means as the primary event probabilities. Table 3 summarises the posterior
uncertainty in the top event probability under different combinations of data type and size.
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Figure 7: Prior distributions on primary event probabilities (left) and the resulting prior on the
top event probability (right), based on the elicitation described in the Appendix.
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Figure 8: The posterior distribution of the top event probability given data that all 5 ATV
spacecraft were observed to re-enter without explosion. The prior from the elicitation in the
Appendix is shown for comparison.
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Data Size 1 5 20 100
Prior
Means (and true value) 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.171
Std. devs 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032
95% PI width 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125
Top Event
Average of:
post. means 0.106 0.108 0.112 0.128
post. std. devs 0.061 0.060 0.058 0.048
post. 95% PI widths 0.228 0.229 0.221 0.192
Top & Intermediate Events
Average of:
post. means 0.107 0.107 0.112 0.127
post. std. devs 0.061 0.060 0.058 0.049
post. 95% PI widths 0.230 0.228 0.221 0.195
Complete Observation
Average of:
post. means 0.106 0.107 0.112 0.127
post. std. devs 0.061 0.060 0.059 0.057
post. 95% PI widths 0.229 0.230 0.226 0.218
Table 3: Average posterior uncertainty in the top event probability for different combinations
of data size and observation campaign, under the elicited prior.
For data size, we look at one observation (being the number of observation campaigns actually
undertaken), 5 (being the total number of ATVs that were de-orbited) and then 20 and 100, to
see what is the impact of a campaign on a satellite series with more de-orbits. For data type,
we consider 3 different observation campaigns: observation of the top event only, observation of
the top and intermediate events only, and observation of all events in the tree. The table is a
summary of the inference of each combination over 100 simulated data sets.
The principal feature of the table is that there appears to be very little difference in posterior
uncertainty between the 3 types of observation. This makes sense in this case since (a) the prior
expectation is that about 83% of top event observations will be that no explosion occurred and
(b) such an observation is logically equivalent to the complete observation that all primary events
did not occur. In other words, in most cases there is no real difference between the different data
types. To emphasise this, Table 4 repeats the analysis with uniform priors on all of the primary
event probabilities, and a similar behaviour is seen.
The conclusion is that, under this fault tree, there is little benefit to a detailed observation
campaign, at least in terms of quantifying the risk of the top event. We note that there are
other reasons to conduct an observation campaign outside the scope of this paper, such as char-
acterisation of the fragment size during spacecraft break-up, the altitude and velocity of those
fragments, etc.
6 Conclusion
An approach to probabilistic risk assessment for a system, using a combination of fault tree
analysis, prior elicitation and Bayesian updating, has been described. Through its use of pairwise
comparisons for prior elicitation, it has particular use in circumstances where the access to experts
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Data Size 1 5 20 100
True Value 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.171
Prior
Means 0.9995 0.9995 0.9995 0.9995
Std. devs 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
95% PI width 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Top Event
Average of:
post. means 0.269 0.188 0.169 0.176
post. std. devs 0.164 0.128 0.078 0.038
post. 95% PI widths 0.644 0.462 0.297 0.146
Top & Intermediate Events
Average of:
post. means 0.716 0.173 0.184 0.171
post. std. devs 0.372 0.113 0.080 0.037
post. 95% PI widths 0.925 0.428 0.306 0.143
Complete Observation
Average of:
post. means 0.297 0.184 0.170 0.176
post. std. devs 0.171 0.127 0.075 0.036
post. 95% PI widths 0.673 0.459 0.284 0.140
Table 4: Average posterior uncertainty in the top event probability for different combinations
of data size and observation campaign, under a uniform prior.
is limited or they have little experience of elicitation methods. The method is illustrated with
an application to spacecraft re-entry risk.
The principal benefits of the approach are the relatively light burden on the expert for elic-
itation, and the proper management of uncertainties through a Bayesian network. Any other
elicitation approach for the primary event probabilities can be ’plugged in’ and used if needed,
including more comprehensive methods that would give richer information.
Software
Software, in the form of R code, is available to implement the methods described in this paper.
At the time of writing, the code derives the likelihood using Equation 3 and implements inference
by MCMC, as in Section 4.4. The code includes sample scripts to run the analyses that generate
Figures 4, 5 and 8. The code is open source under GPL v3 license and can be downloaded from
https://github.com/jlbosque/RiskAssessment.
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Derivation of the Prior Weights wi from Pairwise Comparisons
Our approach follows that of Crawford and Williams (1985), whose derivation of subjective
weights from pairwise comparison scores has some advantages from a statistical point of view
over the original eigenvector approach due to Gulliksen (1959) and refined for AHP in Saaty
(1980). Let qij be the comparison score (on the scale given in Figure 3 in our case) between
events Ei and Ej .
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The weights are defined as geometric means of the pairwise comparison scores. In the case of
elicitation of all pairwise comparisons, these are:
wi =
 n∏
j=1
j 6=i
qij

1/(n−1)
.
If only some of the pairwise comparisons have been made then the geometric mean is
wi =

ni∏
j=1
j 6=i
qij defined
qij

1/ni
,
where ni is the number of comparisons made between Ei and other events.
Derivation of P (Ei |Hi ∩ E, p)
Recall that Hi are the ancestor events of Ei and E are the observed events, so that Hi ∩ E is the
set of observed ancestors of Ei. In this section, this probability is derived in the case when Hi∩E
does not logically imply Ei, for which P (Ei |Hi∩E ,p) = 1. The possible logical implications are:
Ei = 0⇔ ∃Ej ∈ ηi, Ej = 1 when Ei is the result of an AND gate, or Ei = 1⇔ ∃Ej ∈ ηi, Ej = 1
when Ei is the result of an OR gate. By working up the network from the observed primary
events, any such implications are easy to determine.
If Ei is a primary event then Hi = ∅ and P (Ei |Hi ∩ E ,p) = pi. If Ei is not a primary event
then we can write it in terms of its parents ηi as
Ei =
{∏
Ej∈ηi Ej , if AND gate,
1−∏Ej∈ηi(1− Ej), if OR gate.
If any events in ηi are in Hi ∩ E then their value is known and the above expressions for Ei
conditional on Hi ∩ E are
Ei =
{∏
Ej∈ηi, Ej /∈E Ej , if AND gate,
1−∏Ej∈ηi, Ej /∈E(1− Ej), if OR gate. (7)
Recursive application of Equation 7 gives Ei as a function of the unobserved primary events that
are ancestors of Ei, which we denote gi:
P (Ei = e |Hi ∩ E ,p) = P (gi({Ej | j = 1, . . . , k;Ej ∈ Hi;Ej /∈ E} = e |p);
this function is a sum of products of Ej and (1 − Ej) terms. Since each Ej is binary and
independent given p, the probability of this function is gi with each Ej replaced by pj :
P (Ei = e |Hi ∩ E ,p) = gi({pj | j = 1, . . . , k;Ej ∈ Hi;Ej /∈ E}).
Definition of Node Events for the ATV Fault Tree
Tables 5 and 6 give a description of the primary and non-primary events of the ATV fault tree
in Figure 6.
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Event Description
E01 Propellant valve leakage
E02 Propellant tank destruction
E03 Propellant pipe rupture
E04 Pressure vessel burst, with
sudden release of propellant
E05 Chemical reaction between
hypergolic propellants
E06 Battery over-pressure
E07 Battery short circuit
E08 Battery corrosion
E09 Battery over-discharge
E10 Battery over-temperature
E11 Battery cell degradation
Table 5: Description of the primary events of the ATV fault tree in Figure 6.
Event Description
E12 Chemical reaction of propel-
lant and air
E13 Burst of a battery cell
E14 Top event. Explosion of
spacecraft
Table 6: Description of the intermediate and top events of the ATV fault tree in Figure 6.
Prior Elicitation for the ATV
The pairwise comparison matrix for events E01, E02 and E03 was elicited as
Q1 =
 1.00 1.04 1.000.53 1.00 0.53
1.00 1.04 1.00
 .
The cornerstone event for this set of events is E01 and its interval was elicited to be (0.01, 0.04)
The pairwise comparison matrix for events E04 and E05 was elicited as
Q2 =
(
1.00 1.23
0.28 1.00
)
.
The cornerstone event for this set of events is E04 and its interval was elicited to be (0.005, 0.02)
The pairwise comparison for events E06 to E11 was elicited as
Q3 =

1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
 .
In this case, the expert evaluated that each of the primary events that concern a battery were
equally likely. The cornerstone event for this set of events is E06 and its interval was elicited to
be (0.014, 0.055).
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Event Prior Beta prior Prior
weights wi parameters Mean Mode
E01, E03 0.400 2.06, 134.4 0.015 0.008
E02 0.200 1.73, 237.7 0.007 0.003
E04 0.815 1.72, 246.2 0.007 0.003
E05 0.185 1.65, 1078.5 0.0015 0.0006
E06 – E11 0.167 2.70, 113.7 0.023 0.015
Table 7: Prior elicitation results for the primary events of the ATV fault tree in Figure 6.
The resulting beta parameter values for each event probability prior are given in Table 7.
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